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Abstract
In recent decades, Sweden has seen extensive change in its housing policy, with emphasis shifting from “good housing
for all” to marketisation and the supposed benefits of private ownership (Bengtsson, 2013; Grander, 2018). Consequently,
Swedish society is now facing increasing homelessness rates, including whole new groups of social service clients due to
housing shortages and people’s difficulties accessing the housing market. This article examines the complexities emerging
fromdiverging institutional frames and points specifically to a dividing line between thosewho can access housing indepen‐
dently and those who need support from the social services. The article describes how such a categorical division/dividing
line is institutionalised in the organisation of the social services’ work with homelessness and points to causes and effects
of this situation. The case study is based on interviews and documents. The interviewees are staff from the municipal
social services and the municipal public housing company. Our theoretical point of departure is Tilly’s (1999) “categorical
inequality,” using exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaptation to explain how homelessness is (created
and) maintained in our case study. The results show the dependency of social services on external actors and demon‐
strate the problematic consequences both for those referred to social services and for the practical work within them,
including a requirement to stringently control clients. The results further show how it is possible for the social services to
maintain collaboration with (public) housing companies at the same time as the most vulnerable clients are permanently
denied housing.
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1. Introduction
An excerpt from our data reads:
In the mid‐90s, when I worked at the social ser‐
vices unit, one of my clients lived with her family in
a mould‐infested house. She asked me “what shall
I do?” and my first thought was: “What has hap‐
pened?”… When I started [as a social worker] in
the 80s, I would have called the landlord and scolded
him. This was sort of the culture in the 80s. And
then I thought, if this had been the 70s, they would
have closed the bloody office and taken to the streets
demonstrating, complaining about these oppressive
landlords….And in the 90s one asks oneself: “What
shall I do?” And now, it has gone even further…
today they do not even get apartments….An enor‐
mous shift… to the advantage of the landlords. (Leo,
social worker)
The design of the welfare structures is of pivotal impor‐
tance for combating homelessness and ensuring peo‐
ple’s right to housing. The number of homeless people
and the nature of their situations is a telling story about
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the actualworkings of a country’swelfare regime.Whose
needs do the social work practices reflect, andwhose are
being neglected?
Several researchers have described how social work
historically has grown from “empty spots” stringently
surrounded and defined by external pressures and soci‐
etal interests that (today) may be considered peripheral
to social work (cf. Beronius, 1994; Fox‐Piven & Cloward,
1972; Polanyi, 1944; Villadsen, 2004). Social work has
always, albeit in different designs, been a practice partly
or wholly defined by societal pressure. In fact, Villadsen
(2004) highlights social work practice as an analytical
entry gate into understanding the “social contract,” i.e.,
the rights and obligations of groups and individuals, in
society. In this sense, social work practice is a clear sig‐
nal of the forces that dictate society. It is within social
work practice that the dividing lines between citizen
and human, between productive and non‐productive,
and between rights and obligations, etc., are drawn
(Villadsen, 2004). Social work with homelessness can be
considered most central from this point of view because
the lines drawn determine whether an individual will
have a place to live in or not.
Here, we will analyse social work with those experi‐
encing homelessness as described to us by social workers
and others working in social welfare today, by highlight‐
ing practice in the light of broader societal structures and
demands. We will focus on how social work practice con‐
stitutes durable homelessness in accordance with insti‐
tutional demands (cf. Tilly, 1999).
2. Background
The municipalities in Sweden formally self‐govern social
welfare. During the 1980s, Sweden’s universal social
welfare was dictated by market logics (Sunesson et al.,
1998), which had an important impact on social work
with individual clients. Problems that had been regarded
as structural were suddenly met with individual inter‐
ventions and increased marketisation of housing policy
(Sahlin, 2017; Swärd, 2020). Political pressure to dereg‐
ulate the housing stock and sell parts of public hous‐
ing to for‐profit property owners transformed the hous‐
ing stock from being a municipal political tool used to
ensure everyone’s right to housing into a housingmarket.
However, ensuring housing for its inhabitants was still
a municipal responsibility. Acute interventions, such as
shelters,were re‐introduced as part of the socialworkers’
palette of possibilities for “helping” the homeless client
(Knutagård, 2007). Researchers claimed that social hous‐
ing policy had failed and pointed to increasing inequali‐
ties, e.g., differences in health and income, as contribut‐
ing factors. Increasing polarisation, housing shortages,
and segregation characterise this era (Clark, 2013).
As of today, there is a shortage of affordable hous‐
ing for a large segment of Swedish society. Some groups
in Sweden are (more or less) permanently excluded from
the housingmarket for reasons that are not strictly finan‐
cial, while other groups are at risk of exclusion due to
high property prices and rents that are unaffordable for
many (Listerborn, 2018; Swärd, 2020). There are 0.38%
newly built apartments per capita in Sweden, which
implies that population growth has far surpassed the pro‐
duction of new housing (Knutagård, 2018). In Sweden,
compared to the other Nordic countries, a unique sys‐
tem has evolved for the provision of housing for people
experiencing homelessness (Benjaminsen et al., 2020).
Known as the secondary housingmarket, this system can
be seen as social housing by stealth (it being invisible
or hidden). It consists of apartments spread out within
the ordinary housing market. The social services let
the apartments fromhousing companies (predominantly
public, but also private) and then sublet the apartments
to their clients. This type of contract is called a social
contract. The lease often runs for one month at a time
with a notice period of one week. Sweden’s most recent
(2017) national homelessness count showed that there
were 34,000 people experiencing homelessness—half of
themwithin the secondary housingmarket. The national
homelessness definition is divided into four situations:
(1) acute homelessness, (2) institutional care and cat‐
egory housing, (3) long‐term housing solutions (e.g.,
the secondary housing market), and (4) short‐term inse‐
cure housing solutions (National Board of Health and
Welfare, 2017).
The consequence of this system is that, even though
the household lives in an ordinary apartment, they can
quickly end up going back into a more acute homeless
situation. Less than 10% of the tenants can take over
their (first‐hand) contractwithin a year (Knutagård, 2019;
Knutagård et al., 2020). Research has shown that this
system generates other types of housing alternatives
underneath the secondary housing market (Knutagård,
2009; Löfstrand, 2005; Sahlin, 1996). Together, these dif‐
ferent types of housing alternatives constitute the so‐
called staircase model where the client is expected to
climb, step‐by‐step, in order to become “housing ready”
and to progress to the end goal of an independent apart‐
ment with a first‐hand contract (Sahlin, 2005). However,
there are alternatives. The introduction of Housing First
(HF) as an alternative way of working to end homeless‐
ness should, in the Swedish context, be seen as a niche
solution when compared to the wider secondary hous‐
ing market and the staircase model. Only 21 out of 290
municipalities in Sweden have implemented HF services,
and in most municipalities, the HF services are small in
relation to the other housing alternatives that themunic‐
ipalities use (e.g., shelters, transitional housing, training
flats, etc.; see Pleace et al., 2019).
3. Methods
3.1. The Case of Lysboda
Lysboda is a medium‐size municipality with around
60,000 inhabitants hosting industrial companies and
Social Inclusion, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 286–295 287
service companies alike. As with all Swedish municipal‐
ities, Lysboda witnessed the introduction of public hous‐
ing companies and state‐regulated rents in the 1940s
and the deregulation of the housing stock in the 1990s
(Sahlin, 1996).
Around 10 social workers work at the adult unit of
the Social Services in Lysboda,mainly involvingworkwith
aid assessments of support, treatment, and housing for
individuals with substance abuse. Like many places in
Sweden, the issue of housing is constantly relevant, and
it is difficult to find housing for those in need. A few years
ago, a group was appointed that solely works with hous‐
ing issues. The housing group reports to the unit man‐
ager. The housing group consists of four more employ‐
ees: a housing coordinator who has a more prominent
role in the negotiations with the housing companies and
the overall responsibility for housing, a housing secre‐
tary who has a shared position between the municipal
social services, the municipal housing company, and two
administrative staffwhohave responsibility for a few con‐
tracts signed through the social services.
Today we find great variations between the local
housing markets in Swedish municipalities. In some, all
public housing has been sold, and in others, the public
housing companies have a very large share of the rental
market (Grander, 2018). In Lysboda about 1/3 of the ten‐
ancies are owned and managed by the city’s housing
company, still the largest property owner in the city.
3.2. Material and Assessment of Analysis
The material for this article was collected as part of a
case study on the de‐implementation of efforts to com‐
bat homelessness and deal with mental illness based
on recommendations in national guidelines. The munici‐
pal selection was based on the willingness and ability of
municipalities to take part in the study, given that they
had implemented or were about to implement HF or
Individual Placement and Support (IPS). Themunicipality
in this case was about to implement HF and, as we were
involved, we tried to find a baseline of the current state
of affairs regarding their social work with homelessness.
This study is based on data from one municipality that is
particularly and clearly attached to the previously estab‐
lished methods, characterised by qualification rituals on
the part of the client, including stringent control of them.
Social services in Sweden offer support to adults who, for
various reasons, do not receive a housing contract them‐
selves but how generous the social services are may vary
by municipality, as does their formal organisation. Our
case illustrates one way of organising social work with
homelessness and shows the dependence on, and influ‐
ence of, landlords in the formal and informal organisa‐
tion of the social services. The reasons for being excluded
from the housing market (by the landlords) can include
financial difficulties, debts, mental illness, or lifestyles
that make these individuals particularly unattractive to
the housing market. The social services carry out investi‐
gations through social workers and can provide aid with
initiatives that facilitate housing. The most prominent
individual support in this town is 140 sublease (social)
contracts for apartments, a shelter, and housing support
through one team of social workers. Recently, this town
decided to close the shelter and to implement HF, an ini‐
tiative that promotes individual housing as the means
(rather than the endpoint) of solving homelessness, pro‐
vides flexible support, and promotes various aspects of
well‐being (Pleace et al., 2019). However, difficulties in
finding vacant flats have hampered implementation.
Initially in the project, all known and available doc‐
uments (guidelines, reports, decisions), as well as arti‐
cles from newspapers that could be linked to efforts
to combat homelessness, were collected and system‐
atised. For this article, the first and second authors
conducted 13 interviews with 21 respondents in 2020.
We also took part in municipal‐specific documents as
pamphlets of the different contracts mentioned and
municipal (written) routines regarding them, directives
of the public housing company, and more general strate‐
gies set by the social welfare board. Although we do
not refer to this material here, they are included in our
analysis of the case. The interviewees were managers at
different levels as well as politicians and employees of
a housing company. We also interviewed professionals
who meet clients at different levels in the studied organ‐
isations. The interviewees expressed themselves based
on their professional or political roles in their work deal‐
ing with homelessness.
Seven respondents were interviewed individually
(three of whom were interviewed on two occasions).
Six group interviews were conducted with 2–4 partic‐
ipants. Some of the interviews took place in person,
while others were conducted via videoconferencing due
to Covid‐19 restrictions. The interviews were recorded
and transcribed and the material then analysed and cat‐
egorised. In our interviews, we carefully followed admin‐
istrative processes at the social work office and asked
(historical) questions about how certain roles, groups
etc. came into existence, e.g., what had certain roles
been a response to and in what context. Pairing our
categories—e.g., “a landlord’s perspective within the
social services”—and looking at the historical formal
developments that were described to us, as well as
the informal consequences of them, we decided to use
Tilly’s (1999) theorising on mechanisms that create and
sustain durable inequality as our analytical tools. This
case increases our understanding of the causal mech‐
anisms that create unequal positions. From our mate‐
rial, we followed administrative processes at the social
work office and sequentially organised instances of crit‐
ical importance to understand the causes and effects of
institutional demands in social work with homelessness
in this municipality. Our analysis reflects all the inter‐
views, mostly to a large extent. Cited under Section 5,
Findings are trained social workers responsible for the
service user’s aid decision (Eva, Karin, and Lisa). These
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social workers are not part of the specialized housing
group but are responsible for most aid decisions regard‐
ing adults, including housing. Within the social services,
the housing group is led by a trained social worker, the
unit manager Leo, but the housing group staff (including
the group manager) have other backgrounds. Cited from
the housing group were the group manager, Adi, who
was previously a caseworker, and Annika, who holds a
shared position between the specialized housing group
and the public housing company. Annika has a profes‐
sional background as a leisure leader but has worked
with housing issues for many years.
Official functions are stated in the text, all names
are fictitious, but each quotation represents a statement
from a single person. The municipality name is fictitious.
The study has received ethical approval in accordance
with Swedish legislation.
4. Theory
This article draws on Tilly’s (1999) work on durable
inequality and uses the mechanisms put forward by
Tilly to understand how homelessness is (created and)
maintained in a Swedish municipality. His work on
durable inequality identifies how unequal categorical
pairs (e.g., citizen/non‐citizen, legitimate/illegitimate)
become organisationally incorporated and institution‐
alised, which results in organisational conditions that
maintain inequality. Tilly points to four mechanisms that
are active in such an organisational incorporation and
institutionalisation: exploitation, opportunity hoarding,
emulation, and adaptation. Tilly (1999) claims that “peo‐
plewho control access to value‐producing resources solve
pressing organisational problems by means of categori‐
cal distinctions” (p. 8). Such people serve as gatekeepers
and thus delimit social systems by exclusion. Of course,
there are points of transit, but the borders are (at the very
least) highly controlled. These categorical pairs are often
incorporated and institutionalised in organisations deal‐
ing with social welfare and are more easily incorporated
if these categorical inequalities already exist, and have
spread throughout society (Tilly, 1999). The exclusionary
power becomes even strongerwhen pre‐existing external
categories are connected and reinforced to internally con‐
structed categories. For instance, when gender or nation‐
ality relates to internal categories that make a distinction
between “worthy” and “unworthy” clients (cf. Knutagård,
2009; Sahlin, 2020).
Exploitation and opportunity hoarding are consid‐
ered two mechanisms in which paired but unequal cat‐
egories are incorporated at focal organisational borders.
Exploitation appears when people with access to impor‐
tant resources organise to increase their profit at the
expense of others who may be part of profit‐creation
but do not partake of the profit. Opportunity hoarding
appears when people gain access to a valuable resource
that is possible to monopolise and that substantiates the
modus operandi of the organisation (Tilly, 1999).
The two mechanisms, emulation, and adaptation,
make the organisationally incorporated categorical dis‐
tinctions more efficient and generalise the influence
of these distinctions. Emulation occurs when estab‐
lished organisational patterns are copied or when social
patterns are copied from one context to another.
Adaptation concerns, e.g., the development of daily rou‐
tines based on institutionalised categorical pairs, uphold‐
ing categorically unequal structures (Tilly, 1999).
Whilst exploitation may only be used by powerful
people, opportunity hoarding, and emulation may be
used by less powerful people if their actions are accepted
by those in power. People who create durable inequality
often aim at securing profit by either exploitation, emu‐
lation, or both (Tilly, 1999).
In our interviews, the respondents give reasons
for why they work or do something in a certain way
(Tilly, 2006). This is what Scott and Lyman (1968)
call “accounts.” When people give reasons, they gen‐
erally use different types depending on the situation.
Tilly (2008) distinguishes between for different types
of reason: conventions, codes, technical accounts, and
stories. People also use different reasons depending
on the relationship to the receiver. Reason‐giving con‐
firms, negotiates, establishes, and transforms relations




The aftermath of Lysboda shows how the landlords in
Lysboda have exploited the emerging housing market by
denyingmore people and new groups of people the right
to housing, thereby referring these people to the social
services. Having the social services ask for apartments
for tenants instead of having to deal directly with them
has meant that the housing companies havemanaged to
pass this risk onto the social services. A secondary hous‐
ing market has been established in Lysboda where the
social services are the holders of the master lease (the
first‐hand contract, and thus are the holders of responsi‐
bility) a situation in which the housing companies avoid
normal accountability by transferring these risks to the
social services. Although around 40% of the clients liv‐
ing in the second‐hand apartments are considered self‐
sufficient by the municipality and in no need of support
other than housing, the transfer of risk from the land‐
lords to the social services creates conditions that make
these people social service clients. In addition, for other
more traditional social service clients to access housing,
special contracts are formulated involving stringent con‐
trol of the tenants. This is the exploitation by the hous‐
ing company: The closure of access to housing for new
groups of people to gain stability by transferring risk and
decreasing costs that were previously considered nor‐
mal risks for (any) housing company. In addition, this
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also concerns increased control over (some) clients who
are subject to special contracts that are far more inse‐
cure and involve Social Services monitoring the client
(cf. Wirehag, 2021).
5.2. Opportunity Hoarding and Emulation
A few years ago, a group within the social services was
appointed that works solely with housing issues. The
housing group reports to the unit manager and is led
by a group leader who previously worked as the princi‐
pal social worker. In addition to these management func‐
tions, the housing group consists of four more employ‐
ees: a housing coordinator (who has a prominent role
in the negotiations with the housing companies and
the overall responsibility for housing), a housing social
worker (who has a shared position between the social
services department in the municipality and the munic‐
ipal housing company), and two administrative staff
(with responsibility for a few contracts signed through
the social services). The housing group emerged almost
organically, but once in place it is clear how the hoard‐
ing of apartments by the housing group and the closing
of borders (information/negotiation) between (other)
social workers and housing companies placed the hous‐
ing group in a particularly influential position within the
social service organisation. Although most in the hous‐
ing group are not trained social workers, the group dic‐
tates what social work with homelessness in this munic‐
ipality is. The trained social workers get orders for deci‐
sions from the housing group and must formally write
the decisions.
Social work with homelessness, in this as in many
Swedish municipalities, has emulated a social order
building on an external unequal categorical pair that
appeared relatively recently, as people with no or minor
social problems became excluded from the regular hous‐
ingmarket. Having no apartments of their own, the social
services are highly dependent on the goodwill of the
housing companies (cf. Wirehag, 2021). The social ser‐
vices in our case negotiated with the housing companies
on their terms, having to rent apartments from landlords
to sublet to this newly excluded group, thus incorporat‐
ing this external categorical inequality into the routines
of the social services. In addition, negotiating on the
terms of housing companies in this municipality meant
that an internal unequal categorical pair was activated in
which individual service users were referred to as being
worthy or unworthy during the Social Services’ commu‐
nication with landlords.
5.3. The Making of a Client
The social services identify and interact with individu‐
als in need through applications, registrations, or the
on‐call route (application on‐site), such assignments are
then distributed to caseworkers by a group leader. When
a social worker is given an assignment that involves a
person who needs a home, the social worker decides
roughly to “investigate the possibility of a social con‐
tract.” In concrete terms, the social worker adds the indi‐
vidual’s personal identity number to the housing group,
which contacts various landlords with a request for an
apartment. Here, the landlords can be offered various
guarantees, such as that the social services will inspect
the apartment weekly and/or that the apartment is
rentedwith a sublease contract. In caseswhere the social
services inspect apartments weekly, the right of occupa‐
tion has been signed over to the social services after the
person has signed a master lease (first‐hand contract)
with themunicipal housing company. Such an agreement
implies that the resident must accept that the social ser‐
vices have keys to the resident’s apartment. The resi‐
dent must also accept weekly inspections of the apart‐
ment executed by caseworkers (who report that many
of the residents are not home when they inspect the
apartments). In consideration of families with children,
the caseworkers try to agree inspection times with the
residents. In this way, the individual moves from being
a person in need of housing to becoming a service user
and client whomust accept that the authorities interfere
with their self‐determination.
In Lysboda, this path to a master lease is lined by
steps that subject the client to a strong screening with
the need to pass multiple qualifications. Such steps
include accepting and undergoing treatment, accepting
that they sign away their right of possession, which
means being able to accept and handle visits from social
services who can enter the apartment with a key. Such
steps extend far beyond what other tenants must accept.
The service user must show that they are “housing
ready” to, later on, maybe, receive a contract of their
own. Here, we find sharp similarities to the staircase
model described by, e.g., Sahlin (1996), Löfstrand (2005),
and Knutagård (2009), and the recommendation, in the
Swedish national guidelines, is that they should be elim‐
inated (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2018).
If a landlord accepts a negotiated offer, the social
worker decides on the signing of the contract. This is how
one social worker describes the process:
An order for a decision comes in [from the housing
group]….Some questions have been asked about this
person….Then they investigate [if] everything is ready
[and] ask what decision I will make… and a bit in the
formofwhat kind of thing it is, should it be a sublease
or not, there can be a discussion of whether it should
be a sublease or inspections and then they [the hous‐
ing group] come and decide something. (Lisa)
The formulation of the agreement is thus not based
on the service user’s needs (other than a need for a
home) or any other assessment made by social work‐
ers, but rather is dictated by the housing group, which
justifies its influence on the decision by referring to the
requirements of the housing companies. The housing
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group, as the housing companies’ extended arm, has
decisive influence over whether the agreement signed
shall be a master lease or sublease, and whether the
right of possession shall be negotiated, and whether the
social services shall accept the responsibility for inspect‐
ing the apartment weekly. This process may also involve
how the social workers formulate the care plans, as
the social worker Eva explains: “Sometimes, the care
plans come back because sometimes they [the housing
group/housing companies] didn’t think they were good.”
5.4. Helping is Negotiating
The housing coordinator, Adi, with a central position
in the housing group at the social services department,
along with his colleague Annika, explains the hardship of
negotiating apartments:
Adi: We have a few names that, like, “no.”
Interviewer: They are a bit judged in advance?
Annika: There may be someone working in a housing
company who has a relative who knew someone and
knows what he did in 1982….No, he will not have an
apartment.
Adi previouslyworked as a casemanager at the social ser‐
vices department and explains that his role has changed:
As a caseworker, he mainly “chased homes.” When he
was new in his position a few years ago, he and a few col‐
leagues had a serious talk with the housing companies:
We realised that if wewere to get any apartments, we
had to think about how we conduct our work….[We
have to] be honest [and] not deceive [the landlords],
because it is so easy to say that I have got one here
who is well‐behaved when it is actually the oppo‐
site….We have a few [who cannot get a contract],
they live with different friends, perhaps committed
some petty crime, have been imprisoned for a while
or gone for treatment for a while, like in and out all
the time. (Adi)
Adi also explains his own role in focusing on the client
when dealing with landlords. Labelling a client, or creat‐
ing internal categories like “well‐behaved,” or “the oppo‐
site,” is at best moralising over someone’s past actions,
while at worst, it is reproducing a personal stigma—
sometimes perhaps both. Using such distinctions is a
typical example of emulation, using the categorically
unequal pair of the housing companies, incorporating
these distinctions into the work of the social services
with homelessness. While one would imagine that the
negotiations between actors from the social work depart‐
ment and landlords would focus on the form and exten‐
sion of support that the social work department can
offer, the negotiation seems rather to focus on the per‐
sonal characteristics of the client. Are they well‐behaved
or not? It is probably not in the interest of some clients
that their names be mentioned, because the mere act of
naming can apparently exclude them from the housing
market permanently.
The landlords and the housing group act upon har‐
monising and emulating logics, and the housing group
has become a means by which the housing companies
may reject certain individuals and delegate risk (that
would otherwise be a standard part of being a housing
company) to the social services.
As we shall see, the reasons the social workers give
about social work with homelessness and their decisions
are not only supportive andpreventive in relation to land‐
lords, but also controlling towards clients who meet the
demands of landlords. While some clients are provided
with a contract on conditions that seem to mainly serve
the housing companies, others are completely excluded,
and the social services, having exhausted their resources
on clients provisionally accepted by the housing compa‐
nies, have no tools for integrating the most marginalised
into the housing market. Adi’s statements also show that
it is the sharing of very specific information, such as
names and internal categories that makes such exclu‐
sion possible.
The housing group describes itself a little jokingly as
the “landlord group” that “matches apartments as much
as possible.” They explain that they receive assignments
from the social workers:
Adi:We have a queue of peoplewho need help, and if
we get in on a one‐room apartment, it is not, like, the
first in line, here’s yours, but rather we look at who is
this apartment most suitable for.
Interviewer: What do you look at then?
Annika:We look at the area, what we know about the
client and how they would best succeed or fail, that’s
sort of how we think….If we have a substance abuser
for example who is heading out, we don’t want to
put him in a house where we already know that a
known substance abuser lives or in an apartment
next door.….Likewise, we have contact with landlords
who then say no substance abuse in their buildings.
We do not want anyone with a history of substance
abuse so.
Annika holds a position divided between the social ser‐
vices’ housing group and the municipal housing com‐
pany. At the municipal housing company, she is part of a
team that handles social housing issues. Here she works
together with an investigator and a housing coordinator.
Her duties are primarily to monitor disturbances in the
municipal housing company’s apartment holdings. She
describes the work as eviction prevention because she
is the one who reports the disturbances to case offi‐
cers at the housing company. Annika herself decides on
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the taking of various actions: Should a warning letter be
sent? Has a problem gone so far that it is time for an evic‐
tion? Annika reports to investigators at the housing com‐
pany who then carry out her decisions. Her position is
a bridge between the housing company and the social
services department. Her office is at the social services
department, but she has access to the municipal hous‐
ing company’s registers (including the history of the res‐
idents) and can, for example, quickly see if anyone is
behind on their rent. Annika explains the benefits of hav‐
ing access to the public housing company’s register of
their tenants and previous tenants: “I can easily look up
NN, has he paid his rent? And I also have the payment
history of NN.”
The fact that she has dual roles is problematic
because she is the one responsible for preventing evic‐
tions at the same time as being the one who decides
upon consequences, in terms of warning letters and/or
evictions. Annika’s position exemplifies the paradox of
the social worker: They are expected to be helping and
supportive, but at the same time, controlling—and in
this case, even penalising (cf. Järvinen & Mik‐Meyer,
2003). The question arises whether Annika is a gate‐
keeper, deciding who is to be provided for and who is
not, who is to stay in their home andwho is to be evicted.
From this situation, as is a general tendency in our data,
professional social workers are not the ones defining
what social work (with homelessness) “is,” nor are they
the ones protecting vulnerable clients at risk of becom‐
ing homeless.
This case indicates that the organisation of social
work has evolved over time having been influenced by
a broad range of demands through which social workers
have had to navigate. Although our material shows that
some of the professional social workers still try to make
sense of their daily activities and the results thereof, oth‐
ers are more critical. Sahlin (2004) emphasises that the
Swedish state has not intervened enough to end home‐
lessness and presses the fact that persistent homeless‐
ness is the result of poor governance. Situating our case
in its proper (political) context sheds light on the position
of professional social workers, and how their social work
practices with the homeless are dependent on the sur‐
rounding society.
5.5. Monitoring the Client
When we talked about the various contract types, some
social workers reacted to the abuses connected to the sit‐
uations where the tenantmust give up their legal right of
possession to get an apartment:
It is a damned abuse actually. To be able to go into
somebody’s home with a key. Imagine, you can put
yourself into it.… But of course, it is also a chance and
an opportunity....But it is a check that you do and only
a check. (Karin)
At the same time, there is amore pragmatic attitude that
accepts the prevailing (power) structures that demand
the service user’s submission to housing companies and
the Social Services’ rules:
It is nonetheless a check. It is still a check and so like…
and actually an opportunity to check in on them, that
their situation is OK, that we can see it. Because it
is often people who have… had substance abuse and
then we get a chance to see that, oh, now things are
beginning to go wrong. (Eva)
Among social workers, some are strongly critical of the
municipality’s various housing options whilst there are
others who instead describe them positively, thereby
legitimising them as elements of social work. They
give accounts of their actions that can be justified or
excused with the help of organisationally anchored rea‐
sons (Knutagård, 2009; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Tilly, 1999,
2006). One way of justifying the use of such housing
options is to refer to prevailing power structures: “It is
actually the control that gives them [the service users]
the contract; without the control, they would have never
been able to live there, not a chance” (Eva).
The social services department does not own any
housing of its own. The influx of apartments for the
social services’ clients is dependent on the goodwill of
the housing companies. In this way, we can see how
Tilly’s (1999) causal mechanisms—exploitation, oppor‐
tunity hoarding, emulation, and adaptation—come into
play. The housing companies control the resources, the
social services try to get access to housing, but the
relationship between the actors activates emulation.
The social services emulate the procedures of the hous‐
ing companies and adapt to their ways of working to
secure their niche so that housing can be obtained.
The housing companies are the ones who benefit most
from the relationship. This relationship is nothing new
or unique to Lysbod. Sahlin (1996) drew attention to the
same problem 25 years ago. But it does elucidate how
the secondary housing market has become institution‐
alised. The social workers say that the housing compa‐
nies exploit their position of power:
The landlords use it to the max….Yeah, they see a
chance. So, it is wow. Now you are about to be
evicted, but if you get a sublease through the social
services department then you can keep living there.
So, they do see a chance in this. (Karin)
And despite the prevailing power structures, the social
workers are critical of the housing companies’ attitudes:
It is more of a… social problem….You can have SEK
15,000 [EUR 1,479] in debt and no new ones since
then, you are not eligible to live with us….What
the hell is that.…[It] may, after all, be a 20‐year‐old
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debt….[There are] unreasonable requirements today
to be able to have a human right like a home. (Karin)
6. Conclusion
This article’s point of departure was the recent changes
in housing policies with the marketisation of housing
causing increased homelessness. New groups of peo‐
ple are becoming service users due to their difficul‐
ties accessing a flat on their own. This article aimed
to explore how the organisation of the municipal social
work has turned into a means of creating and maintain‐
ing homelessness, as regards people in long‐term hous‐
ing solutions (e.g., the secondary housing market), situ‐
ation 3 in the national homelessness definition, but also
people in acute homelessness (situation 1), institutional
care and category housing (situation 2), and those in
short‐term insecure housing solutions (situation 4) who
may be excluded from housing on the basis of being
unworthy. If offered an apartment, service users in any of
these situations, but more often in situations 1, 2, and 4
may be subjugated to control and monitoring by social
services (cf. Wirehag, 2021). The article was based on
a case study in a Swedish city. Empirical data consisted
of interviews with staff and documents from the social
services and the public housing company. The analytical
tool used here was Tilly’s “categorical inequality,” using
exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adap‐
tation. The results showed the dependency of the social
services on external actors, and the problematic conse‐
quences both for tenants and for the work at the social
services, where the requirement that they control their
clients has become normalised.
In this final discussion we want to highlight three
main conclusions: (1) A power relationship between the
social services and landlords has affected the organisa‐
tion of the social services; (2) the exclusion of newgroups
from the housing market is reinforced by the social ser‐
vices signing contracts with landlords to sublet to this
group; and (3) the effect of this is that the relationship
between the landlords and the social services is main‐
tained even though groups who traditionally turned to
the social services for housing support may have it per‐
manently denied, and that which is offered often comes
with far more insecurity and monitoring than is experi‐
enced by ordinary tenants.
The relationship between the housing companies
and the social services is a relationship of power (on the
part of the housing companies) and dependence (on the
part of the Social Services). Our case demonstrates how
housing companies in thismunicipality exploit this power
to transfer the risk that is normally associated with hous‐
ing companies onto the social services.
New groups of people were excluded from the hous‐
ing market and turned to the social services for help.
The response to the increased pressure was to form a
specialised housing group and to only allow this group
to deal with the housing companies when acquiring
apartments. This group felt they needed a new take
on things and had to win back the trust from housing
companies to negotiate for apartments. To do so, this
group accepted that there were worthy and unworthy
(potential) apartment‐holders among their service users
and had put an old internal (to social work) categori‐
cal inequality (worthy/unworthy) into work. In addition,
an external categorical inequality, excluding new groups
from housing on the regular housing market, was simul‐
taneously incorporated into the organisational front lines
of social work with the homeless.
By subletting to this new group which quite recently
has been excluded from the general housing market, the
social services emulate an external social order building
on a categorical inequality in terms of access to hous‐
ing. The winners are the landlords who are freed from
any risk normally associated with letting apartments,
as they have been transferred onto the social services.
Subletting also carries costs that are borne by the ser‐
vice clients as they live under less safe housing condi‐
tions. Incorporating this external categorical inequality
into the social services workings in this way is not only
to the cost of people in this group but also the regular
social service users as a traditional and internal (to social
work) unequal categorical pairs (worthy/unworthy) are
used to acquire apartments.
The working of external unequal categories, ini‐
tially generated throughout the housing market and
the exploitation of the landlords, emulated through‐
out the workings of the social services is maintaining
inequality. However, alongside this, the incorporation
and reinforcement of unequal categorical pairs along the
organisational lines of the social services is also feeding
inequality in terms of having access/no access to hous‐
ing, generating durable homelessness, alluding to Tilly’s
Durable Inequality.
Our analysis illustrates how client positions are
shaped and how those in need of social services’ help are
placed in a situation from which it is difficult to escape.
Clients are categorised by the institutional demands of
social work, but these institutional demands are struc‐
tured by the broader context in which social work with
homelessness in Sweden is situated. While social work
with homelessness is a product of formal political pro‐
cesses and decision‐making, its design is also greatly
affected by informal processes and negotiations with
local housing companies. In this case, the desire of hous‐
ing companies to minimise their own risk by using the
municipal social services has become entangled with the
Social Services and has altered the institutional demands
placed on the client.
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